Course: Ethics and Moral Philosophy
Raised in a poor family, I find myself confronting a career dilemma: path A where I should pursue a high-income job that promises economic security, the ability to support my family; and path B where I commit to a social work career that aligns with my passion for helping people but offers limited financial stability. Through the lens of Bentham’s utilitarianism, this becomes a question of consequences: which path is more likely to maximize pleasure and minimize pain for all affected? This essay, by using Bentham’s principle of utility, argues that the seven-criteria calculus offers a structured framework to assess the pleasure and pain as consequences of each path. However, Bentham’s recognition of epistemic uncertainty due to imperfect predicting all consequences infers that utilitarian decision-making can be iterative, revising calculations when real consequences emerge.
On the one hand, Bentham’s seven felicific circumstances provide a rigorous framework to examine and compare the expected pleasures and pains of each path, which helps identify the choice that tends to produce the most utility. Bentham grounds the principle of utility in the idea that “pain and pleasure” govern all human behaviour by nature (p. 6), as they determine what individuals seek to pursue or avoid, and form the foundation for evaluating the goodness or badness of actions. For Bentham, an act aligns with the principle of utility when it tends to increase “benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness” and reduce “mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness” for those affected (p. 7). To measure this, he proposes seven criteria or circumstances: intensity, duration, certainty, propinquity, fecundity, purity, and extent (p. 22)[1]. While Bentham’s measurements function as an objective and neutral tool, the application to certain path A and path B requires my explicit assumptions about each case’s consequences. The first assumption is that a stable salary from a high-income job (path A) produces predictable material benefits supporting my poor background while a social work (path B) cannot ensure income stability. The second one is that social work (path B) produces sustained intrinsic satisfaction to my passion while path A cannot. Under these assumptions, path A scores higher pleasure intensity and certainty than path B, because the contractual income is more reliable than contingent emotional rewards, and the benefit of high income is stronger when helping me sustain my life and overcome low living conditions. The propinquity is likely the same for 2 paths as no one promises a sooner pleasure or pain. For duration, the claim that material comforts last longer is conditional as their hedonic value may decline. The fecundity and purity may score higher either path A or path B since both can lead to more pleasure (e.g. more material consumption, making family happy in path A; helping many disadvantaged circumstances in path B), and more pain (e.g. more mental distress, spending for counselling in path A; low living condition, healthcare in path B). For extent, Bentham requires counting all affected parties, that path A directly benefits myself and my family, while path B may extend benefits to clients, communities, and other social networks, which could enlarge its aggregate utility. In the end, Bentham argues that the sum of all pleasure and pain after all calculations proposes what path can produce more utility and should be followed.
On the other hand, after introducing the rule of calculating, Bentham acknowledges the imperfect measurement and suggests the consideration of real experience and circumstances. He argues that “the nearer the process actually pursued on these occasions come to it, the nearer they will come to exactness” (p. 23). In other words, the accuracy of calculation depends on how closely the actual, real-life process matches the ideal method. From my interpretation, this point highlights the epistemic uncertainty inherent in moral calculation due to the limited foresight and unpredictable circumstances that make any evaluation provisional rather than absolute. Bentham identifies specifically the intensity, fecundity, and purity that cannot be fully known in advance, because their value depends on how individuals will in fact experience and use the resulting pleasures and pains. As he notes, it cannot be estimated until “the particular pleasures he may derive from it or the particular pains he may exclude by means of it are brought to view” (p. 23). Hence, identical sources of pleasure derived from it as an asset may yield different consequences depending on how they are acted upon. For example, a high-income job (path A) may initially promise strong intensity of pleasure, but if the income is later used in ways that generate stress, guilt, or strained relationships (e.g. I do gambling, overconsume in shopping, and do not support my family living), the pleasure’s purity may decrease and its fecundity may be limited. Conversely, a social work with lower income (path B) could generate modest initial pleasure but potentially higher fecundity if the act following leads to ongoing fulfilment, wider social benefit, and higher income. So, there is no way to exactly predict all consequences, which infers that the initial calculation cannot be true all the time.
From this approach, rather than rigidly committing to one path, Bentham’s framework can be interpreted to allow a more iterative process of calculating, acting, then recalculating based on the consequences that follow. Bentham states that the consequences of an act depend not only on the act itself but also on the “certain circumstances that enter into the essence of the offence because they contribute by their conjunct influence to the production of its consequences” (p. 48). The “conjunct influence” suggests that the act and its surrounding circumstances, including one’s own past actions or those of others, jointly shape the resulting outcomes. Therefore, a present choice becomes one of the circumstances that will later combine with future acts to produce new consequences, which may or may not align with the initial calculation. In this sense, the first calculation functions as a provisional hypothesis. Acting on it provides new information that enables a more accurate assessment of the criteria and infers to update the calculation that better maximizes utility. While Bentham does not explicitly indicate this iterative model of calculation, his logic accommodates a more practical application of utilitarianism given the unpredictable “nature of things themselves” and the “person’s faculties” at a given moment (p. 48)[2]. For instance, after the calculation likely supporting path A, I choose to do an internship in finance for three months, but I later experience stress and demotivation that affect my wellbeing, academic performance, and family happiness (higher pain intensity than the initial calculation). A recalculation may favour and allow a social-work internship (path B) later. This strategy also reflects the idea of breaking down a complex act (i.e. “doing social work” as a whole career path) into smaller and simple acts to experience and gradually evaluate (p. 46)[3]. The ending point of this iterative process, from my interpretation, would be when the recalculation produces the same results and the maximum of total utility remains stable over time.
To conclude, Bentham’s measurement provides a structured starting point for evaluating the two paths in my dilemma. However, his acknowledgement of imperfect prediction and uncertain circumstances suggests that utility should be recalculated as real consequences emerge. Hence, a Benthamite approach would invite me to measure the utility, reassess the expected utility of my choices over time and adjust my decisions in accordance to maximize pleasure and minimize pain.
References
Bentham, J. (2017). An introduction to the principles of morals and legislation (J. Bennett, Ed.). Early Modern Texts.
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Bentham defines these circumstances as follows: intensity (how strong the pleasure or pain is), duration (how long the pleasure will last), certainty (how likely the pleasure or pain to actually happen), propinquity (how soon the pleasure or pain will occur), fecundity (the likelihood of further sensations of the same kind), purity (the likelihood of not being followed by opposite sensations), and extent (how many people will be affected). ↑
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Bentham notes that “the number and descriptions of the circumstances belonging to an act that appear to a person to be material will be determined by the nature of things themselves and the strength or weakness of that person’s faculties” (p.48). This highlights that the circumstances affecting the consequences depend on unpredictable external conditions and the agent’s capacities at the time, which limits predictive precision. ↑
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Bentham distinguishes between simple and complex acts, noting that a complex act consists of multiple simple acts unified by a common goal, e.g., “giving a dinner, maintaining a child, exhibiting a triumph, bearing arms, holding a court” (p.46). The relevance here is that a “career path” should not be evaluated as one singular act, but rather as a series of smaller decisions and actions regarding the common goal that can each produce their own consequences and be recalculated along the way. ↑